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Abstract 
In this study, I explore the political budget cycle effect on foreign aid spending on 
the extensive and intensive margins. I find evidence to support the statement that 
foreign aid is not neutral to the existence of elections but is in fact manipulated by 
the incumbent government one year before an election. This study is an 
improvement from the recent literature in two distinct ways. First, I explore the 
overall election cycle effect for the different sub-categories of official development 
assistance (ODA): debt relief, infrastructure, humanitarian aid, multi-sector aid, 
production aid, program aid, and social infrastructure aid. Second, I look at the 
compositional changes of total ODA spending one year prior to an election. To avoid 
endogeneity problems, I focused on donor countries with fixed election dates, 
making elections exogenous. I included countries without fixed election dates for 
comparison. I found that some types of assistance have a positive causal donor 
election cycle effect while others have no significant donor election cycle effect. My 
results also indicate donor governments shift aid spending to categories that are 
visible to voters one year prior to an election. The results are robust to the extent that 
the analysis includes numerous control variables to address the possibility of omitted 
variable bias.   
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1. Introduction  
From 2012 to 2016, the current 30 members of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) have donated over 636 billion (US) dollars of official development 
assistance (ODA)1. ODA is any aid flow which is provided by official agencies, including 
state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, which is for the promotion of 
economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective. ODA 
can take on the form of debt relief, economic infrastructure aid, humanitarian aid, multi-
sector aid, production aid, programme assistance, and social infrastructure aid. There are 
many circumstances in which a donor government would help the global developing 
community. For example, in times of emergency disasters, a government could decide to 
increase humanitarian aid in the form of disaster relief. Another example of aid is the 
restructuring of debt to strengthen economic ties or promote trade between two countries. 
Although foreign aid only accounts for a small portion of a donor country’s budget, with 
DAC members having a 0.7% ODA/GNI2 target, the study of the determinants of aid flows 
is crucial in understanding the donor countries’ true intentions. For example, what if the 
aid flows are not caused by pure altruism, but rather selfishly motivated to accomplish a 
political agenda at home? In this study, I explore the political budget cycle effect on foreign 
aid spending on the extensive and intensive margins. I find evidence to support the 
statement that foreign aid is not neutral to the existence of elections but is in fact 
manipulated by the incumbent government one year before an election.  
                                                          
1 This includes only official flows as reported by the OECD between 2012 and 2016 and it excludes aid 
given to multilateral agencies such as the UN. 
2 GNI: Gross National Income 
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While politicians and scholars know foreign aid has some tangible benefits such as 
achieving foreign policy goals and export promotion, a less studied issue is whether 
politicians use foreign aid as a tool to increase their chances of re-election. A recent paper 
by Annen and Strickland (2017) looked at the election cycle effect of one sub category of 
ODA, humanitarian aid, and found a large positive causal election cycle effect. They 
argued that because disasters that prompt humanitarian aid often receive a lot of media 
attention, donor governments increase humanitarian aid spending abroad prior to an 
election to boost support for re-election. In the current paper, I argue that there are three 
reasons a positive causal effect between foreign aid and election cycles exists. First, voters 
care about their government’s capacity to influence the world globally. Second, foreign aid 
can be used as a tool to elevate support from different social communities. For example, 
using multi-sector aid to promote gender and women’s rights globally may attract voters 
who value these issues. Finally, foreign aid can be used to accomplish a policy agenda such 
as trade promotion, which provides economic dividends to the donor country.  
In this paper, I improve upon Annen and Strickland’s results by exploring the 
political business cycle effect on the other 6 categories of ODA: economic infrastructure, 
debt relief, multi-sector aid, production aid, programme assistance, and social 
infrastructure aid. In addition, I look at the compositional changes of total ODA spending 
caused by an up coming election. To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to look at 
these compositional changes. By including all categories of ODA spending and the 
compositional changes caused by an upcoming election, the results presented provide a 
more holistic and insightful view on the relationship between elections and foreign aid 
spending.   
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My results indicate that, on average and for countries with fixed elections, foreign 
aid increases substantially. For instance, social infrastructure and economic infrastructure 
registered the biggest increases of 167% and 117% respectively. On the other hand, 
humanitarian aid increased by only 57% one year prior to an election. More interestingly 
are the compositional changes in total ODA spending, which shows donor governments 
shift spending to aid types that are visible to voters and government determined. I define 
“visible aid” as aid that is easily observable by voters through any form of media and define 
government determined as an aid type that is not heavily influenced by any type of random 
event such as a disaster. My results indicate that, for countries with fixed elections, social 
infrastructure is the most responsive to an upcoming election with its percentage of total 
ODA spending increasing by 101% and production aid being the least responsive with its 
percentage of total ODA spending increasing by 33%. When looking at these results for 
the extensive and intensive margins, they fit well with my hypotheses that: (a) Aid 
spending, on average, increases one year prior to an election; and (b) On average, visible 
aid categories crowed out non-visible aid categories one year prior to an election. 
In line with recent literature, I tested my hypotheses by examining the effects of 
elections in 18 donor countries- 8 with fixed elections, 10 with non-fixed elections- 
between the years 1995 and 2012. Figure 1 shows total expenditure on each of the sub 
categories of ODA. Also included in the figure for comparison is the number of elections 
that occurred each year. The main results focus on the countries with fixed elections 
making elections completely exogenous. I define a country as one that has fixed elections 
if the election occurs at a fixed date and the date cannot be changed by a majority of 
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incumbent elected officials. Fixed elections happen because of institutional constraints 
(e.g. constitution, laws, regulations, etc).  
 
Figure 1: Aid Expenditures by Category 1995-2012 
Finally, I look at the importance of public opinion on foreign aid spending. For this, 
I ran a regression using a public opinion value as a country fixed effect on a subgroup of 
the 18 full sample countries (countries included in the 2013 Eurobarometer survey). 
Treating this value as a country fixed effect allowed me to capture cross-country variation 
in public opinion and the effect this has on the overall aid spending on each sub category 
of ODA. The results indicate that government expenditure on development assistance is 
higher in countries that report elevated levels of support for foreign aid. The importance of 
this result will be outlined in Chapter 5.3.  
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The results I obtain are robust to the extent that I include control variables such as 
real GDP growth, general budget deficit, and party affiliation, and remain statistically 
significant. To avoid endogeneity problems with real GDP growth, the general budget 
deficit, and the amount of foreign aid expenditure, I lagged all control variables by one 
period. All regressions include donor and year fixed effects, so the election cycle effects 
come from within-panel variation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes this study’s 
contribution to the literature, section 3 presents the theoretical framework, section 4 
describes the data, section 5 presents the donor panel results, and section 6 concludes this 
paper. 
2. Literature Review 
Much research has been done regarding donor and recipient specific determinants 
of aid flows. These studies examine the nexus of recipient characteristics and needs, the 
donor’s strategic and political interests, and the size of the aid flows. They find that factors 
such as colonial past, political alliance, trade partners, institutional quality, protection of 
property rights, population, geographic location, and strategic interests are all major 
determinants in the amount and type of aid given to a country (e.g. Alesina & Dollar, 2000; 
Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Classens, Cassimon & Van Campenhout, 2009; Dippel, 2015; 
Dollar & Levine, 2006; Neumayer, 2003). These influential papers on the determinants of 
foreign aid flows tend to focus on the recipient determinants. The current paper 
distinguishes itself from this literature in several respects. First, it shifts focus from 
recipient determinants of aid flow to the donor countries’ determinants, specifically 
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elections. Second, this paper looks at all 7 subcategories of ODA spending, outlined by the 
OECD, individually. Lastly, the most important contribution to the literature this paper 
provides is the finding that one year prior to an election, incumbent governments alter the 
composition of ODA spending. My results indicate that, one year prior to an election, the 
percentage share of total ODA spending increases for types of aid that are visible to voters. 
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to explore the election cycle effect on the 
composition of total ODA spending. 
Traditionally, literature on the political budget cycle focuses on domestic 
expenditure and compositional changes caused by an upcoming election (see Brender, 
2003; Galli & Rossi (2001); Kneebone & McKenzie, 2001; Khemani, 2004; Drazen & 
Eslava, 2010; Hanusch & Keefer, 2014). For example, Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) 
find that Canadian provincial governments tend to increase spending on schools and roads 
in the year prior to an election. A paper by Garmann (2017) tested whether the political 
budget cycle depends on levels of fiscal conservatism among voters. He found that pre-
election spending is increased only if voters have sufficiently low levels of fiscal 
conservatism. If voters are highly fiscally conservative, there is no increase in spending. 
This paper differentiates itself from the main body of political businesses cycle literature 
by focusing on the effects of an upcoming election on foreign aid expenditures, specifically 
each of the ODA subcategories.  An interesting paper by Faye and Niehaus (2012) looked 
at political businesses cycles in recipient countries and aid flows to those countries. They 
found that donors use bilateral aid to influence elections in developing countries; thus, aid 
is not neutral to the existence of elections in recipient countries. This paper adds to this 
argument by showing multiple categories of aid, as well as the composition of total ODA 
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expenditures, are not neutral to the existence of elections in the donor country. A recent 
paper by Annen and Strickland (2017) shows that elections affect humanitarian aid 
spending. By exploring the political budget cycle effect on the sub-categories of ODA, this 
paper echoes their statement that the models of political agency and the election process 
developed by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) should include money spent by the 
incumbent government abroad as well.  
The importance of aid to voters has been identified as key determinant of a donor 
government’s allocation of aid funding. Voters preferences affect not only the quantity, but 
the quality of aid distributions (Mosley, 1985). Paul Collier, the author of The Bottom 
Billion (2007), asserts that a key obstacle to aid reform is public opinion in donor countries. 
He argues that the policies of aid agencies in countries where there is little support for 
foreign aid are overly risk adverse, causing the delivery of aid to be sub optimal. Paxton 
and Knack (2011) argue that understanding the determinants of support for foreign aid can 
help the aid practitioners make better arguments in favor of aid. Improved understanding 
of foreign aid can help develop education efforts to reduce public opinion as an obstacle to 
administering effective aid (Paxton & Knack, 2011).  It has been found that during times 
of economic crisis, such as the 2007-2008 financial crisis, there is generally a reduction in 
aid. For instance, Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Bryan (2015) found that the view that 
budgetary constraints caused by crises reduce aid is inaccurate because donor 
governments’ expenditures tend to increase; rather, aid cuts occur because voters place a 
lower priority on aid. A review essay by Milner and Tingley (2013) looked at foreign aid 
perception in the United States. They found that public knowledge on the budget share of 
foreign aid is enormously over estimated. This over estimation of foreign aid spending may 
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cause voters to change their perspectives on foreign aid during economic crisis and view 
aid flows as a charity they cannot afford (Heinrich et al., 2015). The evidence presented in 
this study simply reinforces the arguments of the above authors that foreign aid is subjected 
to the gauntlet or public opinion, and that public opinion can have both positive and 
negative implications for aid funding.  
3. Theoretical Framework 
The most important mechanism to hold elected politicians accountable for their 
policy choices are elections. Based on the idea that incumbents want to secure re-election, 
Nordhaus (1975) and Tufte (1978) pioneered the literature on “political business cycles.” 
The idea is that incumbent politicians often employ expansionary fiscal policies before 
elections to increase their re-election chances. Precisely, a political budget cycle is a 
periodic fluctuation in a government’s spending policies, which is induced by the 
cyclicality of elections (Brender & Drazen, 2005). Drazen (2008) offers two explanations 
on the phenomenon of political business cycles. The first explanation is that voters’ favour 
low taxes and high government expenditures, and therefore elect incumbents who provide 
them. The second explanation is that voters respond to good economic conditions by being 
more likely to vote for the incumbent. Regardless of the explanations, because voters do 
not observe all government expenditure, there is an incentive for politicians to increase 
spending in areas that voters can observe (Annen & Strickland, 2017).  
For the case of spending on foreign aid, the motivations are slightly different and 
somewhat complicated. First, voters in the donor country may view the capacity to provide 
foreign aid as an indicator of the incumbent government’s ability to influence the world 
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globally (Annen & Strickland, 2017). Second, incumbents can use foreign aid spending to 
woo votes from certain types of voters. For instance, foreign aid spending intended for the 
promotion of women’s rights may appeal to voters who care about women’s issues. Third, 
foreign aid spending can be used to secure better trade deals which accrue economic 
benefits to a donor country which, in turn, can boost the incumbent’s chances of re-election. 
These ideas point to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: On average, all types of aid increase one year prior to an election. 
The above hypothesis can be empirically tested by running a regression with log 
foreign aid (‘aid’) as the dependent variable and an election dummy (‘election’) as the main 
explanatory variable: 
aid𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 ∗ election𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,    (1) 
where i indexes the donor country, j indexes the type of aid, and donor and year 
fixed effects are μ and γ, respectively. In equation (1), the dummy variables ‘election’ 
assumes a value of 1 if an election occurred in the previous year. The parameter αcaptures 
the political business cycle effect. On the extensive margin, I expect that the value of α is 
positive and statistically significant. 
It is possible that the election dummy variable is endogenous to foreign aid. For 
instance, donor governments may choose the date of their elections to correspond with 
elevated levels of voter support generated by addressing social issues or the strength of the 
country’s economy (Annen & Strickland, 2017). If not considered, the endogenous 
relationship between foreign aid and elections may lead to biased estimates for 𝛼𝛼. Hence, 
as in Annen and Strickland (2017), I address the endogeneity problem by running 
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regressions with two samples: donors with institutionally fixed election dates and donors 
without fixed election dates. 
Donors may increase foreign aid allocated towards activities that are visible to 
voters, relative to other types of aid (i.e., the less visible ones). On the intensive margin, 
donors may increase foreign aid to some types of aid that are ‘visually appealing’ to certain 
groups of voters. Take for example foreign aid towards social infrastructure, which is more 
visible than debt relief. Foreign aid directed to social infrastructure through the provision 
of health care, education, water and sanitation, as well as social protection, may appeal to 
voters who passionately care about these issues. A rational incumbent, therefore, may 
allocate more aid to social infrastructure and less toward debt relief with the goal to win 
re-election. 
Hypothesis 2: On average, visible aid categories (i.e. economic infrastructure, multi-
sector aid, social infrastructure) crowed out non-visible aid categories (i.e. debt relief, 
programme assistance) one year prior to an election. 
To test the second hypothesis, I ran the following regression model similar to 
equation (1): 
aid𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
total aid𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽 ∗ election𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,  (2) 
 
My hypothesis is supported if the sign of 𝛽𝛽 is positive and significant for aid that is 
more visible. To address the endogeneity concern, I used the same approach in equation 
(1) where I used a sub-sample of countries with constitutionally fixed election dates. 
Elections with fixed dates are clearly exogenous. 
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4. Data Sources 
The data I used on the national elections in donor countries comes from the National 
Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) database. The NELDA dataset 
includes information on more than 2,600 election events in 157 countries from 1945-2012 
(Hyde and Marinov, 2012). In line with the current literature, I focus on elections where 
the leader of the country’s government is elected. Annen and Strickland (2017) define these 
elections as those which “consist of executive elections in presidential democracies and 
parliamentary elections in parliamentary democracies” (p. 3). The countries included in 
this sample and the election years are summarized in Table 1.  
There are 85 election events in this sample, 41% of which are fixed-term elections. 
The average donor in a non-fixed-term election date country experienced about 5.3 
elections during the sample period, and the average donor in a fixed-term election date 
country experienced about 4 elections. On average, the elections occur 28% of the time for 
the ODA donor countries. 
I obtain the data on Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) database. This study focuses on the following 
categories of ODA: debt relief, infrastructure, humanitarian aid, multi-sector aid, 
production aid, programme aid, and social infrastructure aid. The DAC defines these 
categories of aid as follows: 
• Debt relief is any form of debt reorganization which relieves the overall burden of debt 
(i.e. debt forgiveness, rescheduling, refinancing).  
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• Infrastructure aid covers assistance for networks, utilities and services that facilitate 
economic activity. 
• Humanitarian aid is used for the purposes of disaster prevention and preparedness, 
reconstruction relief, relief coordination, protection and support services, emergency 
food aid, and other emergency/distress relief. 
Table 1: ODA Countries and Election Frequencies 
Country Fixed Election Election Years Incidence Rate 
Australia No 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010 7.06% 
Austria Yes 1998, 2004, 2010 3.53% 
Belgium No 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2010 5.88% 
Canada No 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011 7.06% 
Denmark No 1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011 5.88% 
Finland Yes 2000, 2006, 2012 3.53% 
France Yes 1995, 2002, 2007, 2012 4.71% 
Germany Yes 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009 4.71% 
Italy No 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008 4.71% 
Japan No 1996, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2012 7.06% 
Netherlands No 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012 7.06% 
New Zealand No 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011 7.06% 
Norway Yes 1997, 2001, 2005, 2009 4.71% 
Spain No 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011 5.88% 
Sweden Yes 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 4.71% 
Switzerland Yes 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 5.88% 
United Kingdom No 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010 4.71% 
USA Yes 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 5.88% 
Source: National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) database. 
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• Multi-sector aid is intended for projects which straddle several sectors, with a 
concentration on the environment, gender projects and urban and rural development. 
• Production aid is applied to all directly productive sectors. 
• Programme aid is support for the implementation of macroeconomic reforms 
(structural adjustment programmes, poverty reduction strategies); general programme 
assistance (when not allocable by sector). 
• Social infrastructure aid covers efforts to develop the human resource potential and 
ameliorate living conditions in aid recipient countries. 
The descriptive statistics for the seven categories of ODA are summarized in Table 
2. The data in Table 2 is expressed in million $US. On average, and for the period of study, 
the largest percentage of total ODA spending is on social infrastructure aid, while program 
aid is the smallest percentage. 
Additional donor variables such as real GDP growth rate and general budget deficit were 
sourced from the OECD statistics database. Real GDP growth rate is defined as the 
percentage change in real GDP, while the general budget deficit is defined by the OECD 
as “gross savings plus net capital transfers (receivable minus payable) minus gross capital 
formation, followed by the subtraction of acquisitions minus disposals of non-produced, 
non-financial assets.” This indicator is measured as a percentage of GDP. A positive budget 
deficit value means the government is in a net lending position providing financial resource 
to other sectors while a negative budget deficit value means the government is in a net 
borrowing position requiring financial resources from other sectors. Data for political 
parties was sourced from ParlGov. The political party’s variable, called party affiliation,  
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assumes a value of 1 if the government is right-leaning, 2 if center, and 3 if left-leaning. 
Thus, a higher (lower) value of the party’s variable indicate a left- (right-) leaning 
parliament. Lastly, I obtained the information on foreign aid importance from the 2013 
Eurobarometer survey. 
5. Results 
5.1 Foreign aid and Elections 
Table 3 Panel A presents the regression results for equation (1) using the full sample 
of countries. In all the regressions, I obtain a positive coefficient for the election dummy 
variable. This means that, on average, elections increase foreign aid spending in all aid 
categories one year prior to an election. This is consistent with the hypothesis of foreign 
aid being affected by political election cycles. All the estimated coefficients for the 
elections dummy are significant at the 1% level. Of the different types of aid, social 
infrastructure aid is the most responsive to election cycles while program assistance is the 
least responsive. The results indicate that foreign aid for social infrastructure increased by
Table 2: ODA descriptive statistics (In million USD) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Debt Relief 287 492.84 900.45 -2.44 5,775.11 
Economic Infrastructure 321 613.91 1145.00 3.35 6,111.24 
Humanitarian 320 329.27 778.56 -71.42 5,879.12 
Multi-Sector 320 338.74 461.87 5.26 3,914.99 
Production 321 303.60 428.81 8.54 2,253.47 
Programme Assistance 314 205.78 403.16 0.03 3,676.55 
Social Infrastructure 321 1,567.56 2,631.33 54.85 17,737.23 
Source: OECD. 
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Table 3: Elections and Foreign Aid, Results 1. 
Panel A, Full Country Sample 
 Dependent Variables (In log constant USD) 
 Debt Relief Economic 
Infrastructure 
Humanitarian 
Aid 
Multi-
Sector 
Production Program 
Assistance 
Social 
Infrastructure 
Election 
Dummy 
1.273*** 
(0.331) 
1.370*** 
(0.283) 
1.026*** 
(0.241) 
1.332*** 
(0.264) 
1.272*** 
(0.254) 
0.872*** 
(0.247) 
1.709*** 
(0.325) 
N 286 321 312 320 321 314 321 
Adj R-Sq 0.663 0.786 0.841 0.790 0.798 0.775 0.798 
Panel B, Countries with Fixed Elections. 
Election 
Dummy 
0.643 
(0.607) 
0.775* 
(0.410) 
0.454* 
(0.249) 
0.699* 
(0.398) 
0.631* 
(0.348) 
0.232 
(0.352) 
0.985* 
(0.505) 
N 130 143 143 143 143 139 143 
Adj R-Sq 0.600 0.834 0.933 0.848 0.855 0.820 0.831 
Note: All Regressions include Donor and Year fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significant levels: *:10%; **:5%; ***1%. 
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 a factor of 5 one year before an election. In contrast, program assistance merely doubles 
one year before an election.   
It is possible that the results in Panel A are biased because of the endogenous 
relationship between foreign aid and elections. Hence, I ran a separate regression shown in 
Table 3 Panel B for equation (1) but only for countries with fixed elections. Notable is the 
reduction in the size of the estimated coefficient for the election dummy compared to the 
estimates in Panel A. The reduction in the size of the coefficients suggests that the election 
dummy variable is upward biased. For instance, the estimated coefficients for social 
infrastructure in the full country sample is 1.709 and for the fixed election only sample is 
0.781. According to the log-level formula %𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 = (𝑒𝑒𝛼𝛼 − 1) ∗ 100, the political business 
cycle effect on social infrastructure is 452% and 167% respectively. My results for 
humanitarian aid are similar to the results found by Annen and Strickland (2017) in their 
study on the political budget cycle effect on humanitarian aid. Both coefficients are positive 
and significant, but my results indicate a 58% increase in humanitarian aid spending one 
year prior to an election while their results indicate a 18% increase. Although my results 
indicate a much higher increase, both results support a positive causal relationship between 
elections and humanitarian aid. Although debt relief and program assistance lost their 
statistical significance in the fixed election sample, the coefficients for economic 
infrastructure, multi-sector aid, and production aid are positive and statistically significant 
at the 10% level. When looking at the R-squared values in Panel B of Table 3 for estimated 
coefficients that are statistically significant categories, the model explains over 80 percent 
of the variation.  This result provides evidence on the strength of my hypothesis.
      
 
 
17 
Table 4: Elections and Foreign Aid, Results 2. 
Panel A: Full Country Sample 
 Dependent Variables (In log constant USD) 
 Debt Relief Economic 
Infrastructure 
Humanitarian 
Aid 
Multi-Sector Production Program 
Assistance 
Social 
Infrastructure 
Election 
dummy 
0.889*** 
(0.322) 
1.076*** 
(0.266) 
0.897*** 
(0.246) 
1.130*** 
(0.256) 
1.005*** 
(0.248) 
0.672*** 
(0.244) 
1.333*** 
(0.317) 
Real GDP 
growth rate 
0.492*** 
(0.075) 
0.332*** 
(0.070) 
0.320*** 
(0.066) 
0.370*** 
(0.072) 
0.359*** 
(0.069) 
0.224*** 
(0.061) 
0.558*** 
(0.093) 
General 
budget deficit 
-0.271*** 
(0.041) 
-0.169*** 
(0.033) 
-0.094*** 
(0.024) 
-0.150*** 
(0.032) 
-0.163*** 
(0.031) 
-0.103*** 
(0.025) 
-0.193*** 
(0.039) 
N 263 293 285 292 293 287 293 
Adj R-Sq 0.735 0.822 0.860 0.824 0.834 0.797 0.838 
Panel B: Countries with Fixed Elections Only. 
Election 
dummy 
0.440 
(0.531) 
0.655* 
(0.393) 
0.386 
(0.242) 
0.627* 
(0.364) 
0.497 
(0.322) 
0.141 
(0.358) 
0.781* 
(0.466) 
Real GDP 
growth rate 
0.467*** 
(0.132) 
0.164* 
(0.087) 
0.127* 
(0.066) 
0.215** 
(0.088) 
0.181** 
(0.083) 
0.009 
(0.071) 
0.359*** 
(0.122) 
General 
budget deficit 
-0.264*** 
(0.051) 
-0.134*** 
(0.032) 
-0.049*** 
(0.016) 
-0.049*** 
(0.016) 
-0.112*** 
(0.030) 
-0.086*** 
(0.024) 
-0.150*** 
(0.039) 
N 123 135 135 135 135 132 135 
Adj R-Sq 0.697 0.856 0.938 0.869 0.876 0.834 0.857 
Note: All Regressions include Donor and Year fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significant levels: *:10%; **:5%; ***1%. 
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Table 4 presents the regression results for equation 1 with additional control 
variables, real GDP growth rate, and general budget deficit. Including real GDP growth is 
important because income of the donor country is one of the most important determinants 
of aid. I included general budget deficit as an additional control as this represents the fiscal 
decisions incumbent governments make. As shown in Panel A, Table 4, including real GDP 
growth and general budget deficit in the regressions did not change the signs of the 
estimated coefficients for the full donor sample, and all of the estimated coefficients are 
significant at the 1% level. However, some of the aid types lost their statistical significance 
for the fixed election sample. The estimated coefficients that remained statistically 
significant in the fixed election only sample are for economics infrastructure, multi-sector, 
and social infrastructure. These coefficients are significant at the 10% level. When looking 
at real GDP growth, as expected, in the full sample is positive and significant at the 1% 
percent level; this means that as a country’s real income increases, their foreign aid 
expenditures increase. For the fixed sample, real GDP growth is still a powerful 
determinant of foreign aid expenditures with only programme assistance losing all 
significance. Intuitively, the sign of the general budget deficit is consistent with the notion 
that as a country’s budget deficit increase, foreign aid expenditures decrease. When 
comparing the R squared values from Tables 3 and 4, all R-squared values are higher in 
the latter. The driving force behind this increase is the inclusion of the control variables 
real GDP growth and general budget deficit. In Table 3 and Table 4, when looking at the 
most responsive aid type social infrastructure, Table 3’s R-squared value is 0.831 and Table 
4’s value is 0.857. These results imply that 83.1% of the variation in social infrastructure 
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spending is explained by the election cycle while inclusion of the controls in Table 4 
increases the explanatory power of the model by merely 2.6% to 85.7%.  
It is well known that left-leaning governments have different spending preferences 
than right learning governments. Beland and Oloomi (2017) investigated whether party 
affiliation of governors in the United States (Democrat or Republican) has an impact on 
the allocation of state expenditures. They found that Democratic governors allocate a larger 
share of their budget to health and education but there was no impact on total spending. 
Hence, to capture incumbent governments preferences, I included the political party’s 
affiliation variable in the regressions, and the estimation results are presented in Table 5. 
Including political party’s affiliation failed to overturn the results in Table 3. The estimated 
coefficients of the party affiliation variable are positive and significant at the 1% level in 
both the Panel A, the full country sample, and Panel B, the fixed elections only sample. As 
mentioned previously, this variable can take on 3 values: 1 if the government is right 
leaning, 2 if centric, and 3 if left leaning. This implies that political parties that are left 
leaning spend more on all categories of foreign aid than political parties that are centric 
and right leaning.  
When including party affiliation along with real GDP growth and budget deficits, 
the resulting election coefficients are all still positive but smaller than those found in Table 
3. When including the party affiliation value, social infrastructure remains the most 
responsive, 111% compared to the results in Table 3, 167%. This decrease, along with an 
increase in R-squared values, suggests the results in Table 3 are biased due to omitted 
variables. In Table 3, social infrastructure’s R-squared value is 0.831, meaning the model 
used explains 83.1% of the variation in social infrastructure spending. In Table 5, the R-
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Table 5: Elections and Foreign Aid, Results 3. 
Panel A: Full Country Sample 
 Dependent Variables (In log constant USD) 
 Debt Relief Economic 
Infrastructure 
Humanitarian 
Aid 
Multi-Sector Production Program 
Assistance 
Social 
Infrastructure 
Election 
dummy 
0.883*** 
(0.315) 
1.055*** 
(0.264) 
0.885*** 
(0.246) 
1.120*** 
(0.256) 
0.989*** 
(0.248) 
0.659*** 
(0.237) 
1.305*** 
(0.314) 
Real GDP 
growth rate 
0.467*** 
(0.074) 
0.313*** 
(0.069) 
0.309*** 
(0.065) 
0.360*** 
(0.072) 
0.345*** 
(0.068) 
0.203*** 
(0.059) 
0.532*** 
(0.091) 
General 
budget deficit 
-0.263*** 
(0.040) 
-0.163*** 
(0.031) 
-0.090*** 
(0.023) 
-0.147*** 
(0.031) 
-0.158*** 
(0.030) 
-0.096*** 
(0.023) 
-0.184*** 
(0.036) 
Party 
affiliation 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
N 263 293 285 292 293 287 293 
Adj R-Sq 0.741 0.828 0.862 0.825 0.837 0.809 0.845 
Panel B: Countries with Fixed Elections. 
Election 
dummy 
0.422 
(0.517) 
0.627* 
(0.364) 
0.368* 
(0.221) 
0.609* 
(0.357) 
0.476 
(0.307) 
0.134 
(0.311) 
0.746* 
(0.433) 
Real GDP 
growth rate 
0.414*** 
(0.134) 
0.119 
(0.080) 
0.098 
(0.060) 
0.185** 
(0.083) 
0.147* 
(0.077) 
-0.039 
(0.068) 
0.303*** 
(0.111) 
General 
budget deficit 
-0.266*** 
(0.050) 
-0.137*** 
(0.029) 
-0.051*** 
(0.013) 
-0.114*** 
(0.028) 
-0.124*** 
(0.026) 
-0.090*** 
(0.021) 
-0.154*** 
(0.035) 
Party 
affiliation  
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
N 123 135 135 135 135 132 135 
Adj R-Sq 0.708 0.878 0.948 0.877 0.890 0.870 0.878 
Note: All Regressions include Donor and Year fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significant levels: *:10%; **:5%; ***1%. 
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squared for social infrastructure is 0.878, meaning this model explains 87.8% of the 
variation in social infrastructure spending. This increase in explained variation is a direct 
result of the inclusion on Real GDP growth, the general budget deficit, and party affiliation. 
These three controls only account for 4.7% of the variation in social infrastructure 
spending. When comparing the R-squared values from Table 4 and Table 5 for social 
infrastructure, 0.857 and 0.878 respectively, it really highlights the importance of including 
the political party’s preference in the model. These values indicate that party affiliation 
explains 2.1% of variation in social infrastructure spending, almost the same amount as 
real GDP growth and the general budget deficit combined. All R-squared values are 
greatest in Table 5 because inclusion of the three controls increases the explanatory power 
of the model. 
5.2 Elections and Visible Aid 
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients for equation (2), which estimate the 
compositional changes to ODA spending caused by an upcoming election:  
aid𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
total aid𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽 ∗ election𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,  (2) 
When looking at the full country sample presented in Panel A, one can observe that 
all the coefficients are positive with program assistance losing all significance and debt 
relief only appearing significant at the 10% level. More interesting are the results from the 
sample of countries with fixed elections presented in Panel B. All coefficients remain 
positive, but a significance drop across all forms of aid occurs with debt relief and 
humanitarian aid losing all significance compared to the full country sample. Also notable 
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Table 6 Elections and Visible Aid 
Panel A: Full Country Sample 
 Dependent Variables (log, share of aid to total ODA) 
 Debt Relief Economic 
Infrastructure 
Humanitarian 
Aid 
Multi-Sector Production Program 
Assistance 
Social 
Infrastructure 
Election 
dummy 
0.468* 
(0.244) 
0.782*** 
(0.133) 
0.463*** 
(0.156) 
0.704*** 
(0.127) 
0.645*** 
(0.121) 
0.223 
(0.148) 
1.076*** 
(0.198) 
N 280 281 275 281 281 281 281 
Adj R-Sq 0.280 0.756 0.685 0.735 0.735 0.420 0.760 
Panel B: Countries with Fixed Elections. 
Election 
dummy 
0.379 
(0.384) 
0.466** 
(0.201) 
0.169 
(0.205) 
0.471** 
(0.187) 
0.282* 
(0.163) 
0.053 
(0.168) 
0.700** 
(0.318) 
N 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Adj R-Sq 0.158 0.799 0.785 0.816 0.813 0.473 0.792 
Note: All Regressions include Donor and Year fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significant levels: *:10%; **:5%; ***1%. 
      
23 
 
is the reduction in size of the coefficients from Panel A to Panel B. As with Table 3, this 
coefficient reduction suggests upward endogeneity bias. As stated before, endogeneity bias 
may exist in the full country sample because a donor country, which does not have an 
institutionally fixed election, may choose the date of their elections to correspond with 
elevated levels of voter support generated by addressing social issues or the strength of the 
country’s economy (Annen & Strickland, 2017).  
These results are in line with my hypothesis that incumbent governments 
manipulate the composition of total ODA spending and shift aid spending to areas that are 
visible to voters and can provide economic dividends to the donor country and do not 
depend on emergency situations. In other words, one year prior to an election, aid that is 
visible to voters has a higher percentage share of ODA spending. 
When looking at the percentage of total ODA spending changes, Social 
Infrastructure is the most responsive in both the full sample and fixed election sample, 
193% and 101% respectively. In the fixed sample, production assistance is the least 
responsive to an upcoming election, 33%. These numbers indicate that the percentage of 
total ODA spending allocated to social infrastructure doubles one year prior to an election 
while production assistance percentage share of total ODA increases by only 30 percent.  
5.3 Aid Importance 
I included a regression using Aid Importance as the explanatory variable to show 
the effect of voter’s preference on foreign aid spending decisions. In this regression, due to 
the low overlap between the 18-country sample used in previous regressions and the 
countries where this survey was distributed, I could not separate fixed election countries 
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from the full sample. Instead, I grouped all overlapping countries together into a single 
sample. There is a possibility of an endogenous relationship between policy and public 
preferences which may cause bias in the estimated coefficients. In this analysis, I am not 
concerned with the magnitude of the estimated coefficients but rather the sign of the 
estimated coefficients as this represents the relationship between voters’ preferences and 
foreign aid spending. I derived this variable from the 2013 Eurobarometer survey. This 
survey included the following statement and question:  
B. EU DEVELOPMENT AID AND MILLENIUM DEVELOPMENT 
GOALS 
The EU provides development aid to assist certain countries outside the 
EU in their fight against poverty and in their development. EU 
development aid consists of the aid provided by both the European 
Commission and the national Governments of the EU Member States. 
QB1 
In your opinion, is it very important, fairly important, not very important 
or not at all important to help people in developing countries? 
Respondents were required to answer a Likert scale that had 5 points: very 
important, important, not very important, not at all important, and DK. The results were 
presented as a percentage of total respondents for each of the four importance levels. To 
generate my aid importance variable, I grouped the very important and fairly important 
respondents together and used this percentage value as the fixed effect for each country 
that took part in the survey and is part of the 18-country sample.
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Table 7 Aid Importance and Foreign Aid 
Full Country Sample 
 Dependent Variables (log, Constant USD) 
 Debt Relief Economic 
Infrastructure 
Humanitarian 
Aid 
Multi-Sector Production Program 
Assistance 
Social 
Infrastructure 
Importance -8.381*** 
(2.054) 
4.169*** 
(1.589) 
7.923*** 
(0.830) 
2.329 
(1.418) 
0.799 
(1.096) 
0.028 
(1.663) 
1.815 
(1.178) 
N 286 321 312 320 321 314 321 
Adj R-Sq 0.677 0.796 0.843 0.793 0.804 0.790 0.809 
Note: All Regressions include Donor and Year fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significant levels: *:10%; **:5%; ***1%. 
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The results are summarized in Table 7. The results indicate that countries where 
voters place higher importance on foreign aid spend more on foreign aid. I found that only 
economic infrastructure and humanitarian aid are positive and significant at the 1% level, 
while debt relief is negative and significant at the 1% level. All other forms of aid were not 
found to be significant. The results are presented to demonstrate that foreign aid levels are 
directly related to public preferences on aid flows. The explanation to this could have 
something to do with the public’s perception and understanding of foreign aid. Public 
perception about foreign aid and what foreign aid is tends to fall into economic 
infrastructure and humanitarian aid categories (e.g. building bridges and emergency food 
aid) while other forms of aid such as programme assistance are unbeknownst to the general 
populace. An incumbent government looking at results from the Eurobarometer survey 
knows about this skewed perception towards visible aid and knows that if they want to 
increase support for re-election, they must act in a way to show voters they pursue policies 
consistent to their preferences. 
The results from this regression are in line with the work from Heinrich, Kobayashi, 
and Bryant (2015) who looked at public opinions and foreign aid cuts in economic crises. 
They argue that during times of economic crisis, public opinion about helping the global 
poor changes and that the levels of aid are overestimated and seen as a form of charity. 
Extending their results that voters’ perception of aid impacts government aid decisions and 
combining the results I found support a causal relationship between voter’s aid attitudes 
and government foreign aid spending decisions. As such, an incumbent government may 
take advantage of voters overestimating the values of foreign aid and increase aid spending 
in visible areas to increase support for re-election.  
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6. Conclusion 
This paper provides insights into the political determinants of debt relief, economic 
infrastructure aid, humanitarian aid, multi-sector aid, production aid, programme 
assistance, and social infrastructure aid from the donor countries’ perspective. The 
empirical analysis in this paper supports the theory that foreign aid is not neutral to the 
existence of elections. Rather, several categories of ODA see substantial increases on the 
extensive margin one year prior to an election. On the intensive margin, the composition 
of aid is also not neutral to the existence of elections. One year prior to an election, the 
percentage of visible aid, with respect to total ODA spending, increases substantially 
relative to non-visible aid. This result provides evidence of a crowding out effect of visible 
aid prior to an election. For the analysis on the extensive and intensive margins, I focus on 
countries with fixed elections making elections clearly exogenous. Lastly, this analysis 
includes regressions on voter’s preferences towards development aid.  It shows that 
countries spend more on foreign aid when their populace places higher importance on aid 
spending. 
Further research on the election cycle effect on ODA spending should include more 
data. For example, the country sample could be expanded to include all 30 DAC members, 
as well as expanding the time periods to include more elections. Another avenue for further 
research is to look at technological advancement in how voters receive information and the 
election cycle effect on foreign aid (e.g. pre vs post broadband internet adoption, pre vs 
post wide spread social media adoption) to see if these social changes affect the election 
cycle effect on foreign aid. Finally, the inclusion of a dyadic panel analysis of bilateral aid 
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and development of a formal theoretical model to explain the results found in this paper 
would help enrich the results. 
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